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In the 
upreme Court of the State of Utah 
LARENCE M. STAMP, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
NION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8463 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for personal injuries brought under 
1e Federal Employers' Liability Act ( 45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 
1 et seq.), which will be referred to hereinafter as the 
'. E. L. A. The respondent, Clarence M. Stamp, will be 
~ferred to as the plaintiff; and the appelant, Union Pacific 
,ailroad Company, will be referred to as the defendant. 
The plaintiff, Clarence M. Stamp, employed by the 
efendant since March 1942 as a brakeman or conductor 
R. 11) was on November 6, 1954 working as the rear 
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brakeman on a 99-car freight train proceeding from Rawl-
ins, Wyoming, west to Green River, Wyoming (R. 19, 20). 
The plaintiff was riding in the caboose at the rear of the 
train as the train approached Green River, when the train 
slowed down, then came to a stop, which the plaintiff 
claimed was rougher than an ordinary stop ; and a flag-
man's kit containing fusees and torpedoes, used by brake-
men to flag trains, was thrown from the bench on which 
it was located to the floor of the caboose (R. 24) . The 
plaintiff observed that the fusees and a strip of torpedoes 
had slid out of the kit and were lying on the floor (R. 26). 
The plaintiff described the torpedoes as follows : 
"These torpedoes * * * are approximately 
two inches square-probably a half-inch thick. 
Written across them is the word 'Danger'. Then, 
extending on each side of this torpedo and fastened 
to it is a metal strap. It extends out approximately 
three inches on each side of the torepdo." 
Q. (By plaintiff's counsel) "Explain to us 
how that is used." 
A. "When we place a torpedo on the track, we 
place it with the word 'Danger' up * * * then 
we clamp each end of the strap around the rail to 
hold it to the rail." 
Q. "Are these torpedoes explosive?" 
A. "Yes, sir" (R. 15). 
The function of the torpedo is to explode when an 
engine goes over it, and such explosion is a warning signal 
to the engineer (R. 14). The fusee is a cylindrical object 
about an inch in diameter, about 10 to 12 inches long, with 
a spike about 4 inches long on one end of it. (See Exhibits 
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~and 5.) The flagman's kit (See Exhibit 1) had two com-
partments and was about the length of a fusee. 
After the caboose slowed down, the plaintiff states he 
put the flagman's kit up on its end, put the strip of torped-
oes in one compartment of the kit, then dropped a fusee 
spike down into the other compartment, and an explosion 
Dccurred (R. 27). 
The explosion blinded the plaintiff temporarily, and 
he staggered back to a bench and sat down (R. 28). 
The train then started up again and proceeded into 
the depot and stopped, and plaintiff was driven to a doc-
tor's office (R. 30). Doctors examined his eyes and de-
cided he should be sent to a specialist in Cheyenne (R. 31). 
The accident occurred about 10:10 a. m. (R. 2) and 
about 12 :30 p. m. plaintiff boarded an eastbound train 
for Cheyenne, accompanied by an Assistant Superintendent 
(R. 39). By this time he could distinguish the light of a 
match with his right eye but could still see nothing out of 
his left eye (R. 39). He entered a hospital at Cheyenne 
at 6 :20 p. m. November 6, 1954, where he was examined and 
treated by an eye specialist. 
He remained in the hospital until November 10, 1954. 
Dn the morning of November 8 the bandage was removed 
from his right eye and was left off, and he states that he 
'could see to get around the hospital" (R. 41, 42). On the 
norning of November 9 he left the hospital and went to the 
loctor's office, where he was examined again. The doctor 
~emoved the bandage from his left eye and asked him to 
~ead a chart, and he claims he couldn't see the chart with 
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his left eye. The left eye was re-bandaged, and he returned 
to the hospital. The next morning, the lOth, he was ex-
amined by the doctor again, the bandage removed from 
his left eye, and the doctor sent him home and asked him to 
report back in a week. He checked out of the hospital and 
returned to his home in Rawlins, Wyoming (R. 43). 
He states that when he got home, his right eye "didn't 
seem to bother me at all", but his left eye still gave him 
concern; but he could see out of it to an impaired degree 
(R. 44). He returned to the doctor on November 17, and 
the doctor examined his eyes and told him he could go to 
work (R. 45). He returned to work on the afternoon of 
the 17th or 18th (R. 46). The only time lost by reason of 
the accident was from November 6 to November 17 or 18, 
or eleven or twelve days (R. 46). He testified his wage 
was between $550 and $600 a month (R. 12). 
He complained in his testimony of the unpleasantness 
of particles working out of his eyes (R. 48) and of head-
aches that occurred on sunny days if he didn't wear dark 
glasses, which headaches were relieved when he put on 
dark glasses; and he claimed constant worry about his eye-
sight (R. 47). 
He testified that the Cheyenne specialist told him the 
headaches were not due to his eyes (R. 50). 
Dr. Bascom \V. Palmer of Salt Lake City was called by 
the plaintiff to testify in his behalf, and his entire testi-
mony is as follows : 
"Q. (By plaintiff's counsel) Will you tell us 
your name, please? 
"A. Doctor Bascom W. Palmer. 
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"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
that? 
"A. 
5 
You live in Salt Lake City? 
Yes, sir. 
Your profession is what? 
Ophthalmologist. 
What is that? 
Diseases of the eye. 
And, how long have you specialized in 
About twenty-five years, sir. 
"Q. And, you are licensed to practice medicine 
in the State of Utah? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"MR. BERTOCH: I will stipulate that Dr. 
Palmer qualifies. 
"MR. ROBERTS: May it be that the record may 
show that, Your Honor, 
"THE COURT: It may. 
"Q. (By Mr. Roberts) Have you had occasion 
to examine Mr. Clarence Stamp? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. How many occasions? 
"A. On two occasions. 
"Q. The first occasion was when? 
"A. November the 19th, 1954. 
"Q. Here in Salt Lake City? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. Will you tell us what your examination 
disclosed? 
"A. Examination of the right eye revealed 
four to six small crystal-like foreign bodies in the 
cornea directly below the apex, that is, the center 
of the cornea at 7:30 o'clock. 
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"Q. First, Would you tell us what the cornea 
of the eye is? 
"A. Well, the cornea is the watch crystal of 
the eye. It is the transparent tissue that covers the 
anterior surface of the eye in front of the anterior 
chamber. Does that answer it? 
"Q. Yes, I think that is clear. Now, will you 
continue then, Doctor? 
"A. Quote: 'The rest of the cornea is clear. 
The apex of the cornea seems clear. The anterior 
chamber is deep. The iris appears very normal; it 
is active; pupil is small and round and active. The 
anterior surface of the lens is perfectly clear-in 
fact, the entire lens is clear.' Now, unquote. 
"Now, that was the right eye. Examination of 
the left eye show several small crystal-like foreign 
bodies, one about two milimeters from the limbus. 
The limbus is where the colored part and the sclera, 
or white part of the eye, comes together. I would 
draw this if you would like for me to. 
"MR. ROBERTS: Maybe it would be helpful 
if you would, Doctor, and then we could get a better 
picture of it." 
(Witness goes to the board.) 
"THE WITNESS: Now, this is an eye. 
"THE COURT: The drawing that the Doctor 
made may be marked Exhibit Four. 
"THE WITNESS: Now, this is a drawing of 
the eye that we cut in half this way (Indicating), 
and look from the side, and this is the cornea, and 
this is the clear part of the eye. This is the iris 
(Indicating) , and this is either the brown or blue 
or grey part of the eye, and this is the pupil, the 
hole, and behind the pupil is the lens, and then this 
is where the vitreous chamber is and the anterior 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
chamber, and this is the vitreous chamber. Now, 
there were several foreign bodies hit this gentle-
men-luckily, not in the center of the cornea, but 
adjacent to the center, and he had four or five crys-
tal-like foreign bodies, like you would find in a tor-
pedo-little grains of sand buried in his cornea-not 
through the cornea, and each place that the foreign 
bodies hit they leave a very small-in what we call 
the nebula-little tiny scars. Now, the scars are 
not too dangerous if they are not in the center, be-
cause it stands to reason this is the most part of the 
cornea in front of the pupil. 
"Q. Now, that was the left eye-you said how 
many? 
"A. Let's see~I stated several. That means 
three or four or five small foreign bodies. Now, 
these were embedded in each eye-in each cornea. 
"Q. Could you tell us whether there were for-
eign bodies in the eye which had worked out? 
"A. At that time there were several places 
that the foreign bodies probably had worked out, 
but many of these were present at that time I saw 
him. 
"Q. That was the first time? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. Now, did your examination disclose any-
thing other than what you have told us? 
"A. Let's see-now, other than these foreign 
bodies in the left eye, adjacent to, and out of the 
apex of the cornea, there was no other pathology 
found. 
"Q. What about the sight? 
"A. The sight was at that time 20/20 without 
correction, and he read the finest print, J eager One, 
without difficulty, although this man was forty-three 
years of age, and at this time would have necessarily 
have accepted a plus-fair for reading. 
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"Q. And, then your next examination of Mr. 
Stamp was when? 
"A. My next examination was yesterday. 
"Q. And, will you tell us what that examina-
tion disclosed? 
"A. Under the slit lamp, which is the micro-
scope, no scleral injection. That means the eye was 
not red. The same nebulas or scars and small bits 
of foreign bodies were found in the cornea, as prev-
iously described. In a few places, one at five o'clock 
about two-and-a-half millimeters from the limbus 
seemed to have worked out and healed over. The 
apex of the cornea seems free of any foreign bodies 
or scarring. The pupil is round, even, and active. 
The iris is of normal color, and the lens is clear, 
that is the right eye cornea. Left eye cornea, like-
wise, has the same scarring which consists of small-
minute white areas where the little pebbles struck 
the cornea. A good many of these seemed to have 
worked out, because it is hard for me to find any 
definite foreign bodies in the cornea. There is one 
at three o'clock about two milimeters from the lim-
bus; that is definitely present. The apex of the 
cornea is clear, the iris is active, the pupil is round 
and even, and the lens is clear. There is no scleral 
injection. The back of the eye, or fundus of the 
posterior surface of both eyes were found to be 
normal. 
"Q. Between the two times you examined him, 
had some of these particles worked out? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Could you describe that process, please, 
which occurred? 
"A. What occurs is that the little rocks or 
grains of sand worked to the surface of the cornea, 
and as they worked to the surface of the cornea 
there is feeling of a foreign body at the time being 
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just as if you would get a grain of sand in your eye. 
Then it is necessary probably for that person to sleep 
over night so that the lid isn't working up and down 
over the cornea for that little area to heal, but it 
heals very rapidly and very readily if it is not in-
fected. Then the next morning the patient has no 
feeling of the foreign body and has gotten rid of 
another little particle. 
"Q. And, what about the chances of infection 
in connection with working out of these small for-
eign bodies? 
"A. There is very little, because we-of course 
we can receive-get infections any time, and you 
are more prone for the simple reason that the patient 
might rub their eyes at that time, but an eye stays 
remarkably clear, unless some dirty hankerchief or 
some attempt with a dirty object is used to remove 
the foreign body from the cornea. 
"Q. Doctor, is there discomfort to the working 
out? 
"A. There is like a foreign body being in the 
eye. 
"Q. Does the eye water? 
"A. Yes, waters and irritates and gets a little 
red. 
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not the foreign bodies that are present there now 
will come out in the future? 
"A. No, I wouldn't know. I believe most of 
them have worked out that are going to work out-
it's been a year. 
"Q. And, what can you say for the future so 
far as his eye is concerned? 
"A. I can't say. I don't feel that Mr. Stamp 
is in any danger. 
"MR. ROBERTS: You may cross-examine." 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
"BY MR. BERTOCH: 
"Q. Doctor Palmer, if I understand you cor-
rectly in your examination of November 19th-I 
think this accident occurred on November 6-at that 
time you discovered apparently that the accident 
had not in any way impaired his vision, is that 
right? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And, I suppose you told him that at that 
time? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. And, today you find now after several 
months has past that your opinion at that time is 
confirmed there still appears there is no harm done 
to the eyes as far as vision is concerned? 
"A. No. I don't think so far close work or 
distance or field of vision. 
"Q. I believe you prescribed glasses for him 
in November-that had nothing to do with the ac-
cident? 
"A. That is true. In other words, his need for 
glasses for distance were so small I couldn't pre-
scribe for him, but the need for close work glass 
was due to the forty-four years of age. 
"Q. In other words, there is no object that 
the accident had anything to do with requiring 
glasses? 
"A. Not so far as my examination so revealed. 
"Q. These foreign bodies are working out-
do you think if they don't work out will he be con-
scious of them at all? 
"A. I don't believe so. 
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"Q. You see no reason why he should have 
irritation from them? 
"A. I don't see how it could. He has no scleral 
injection in the eye. 
"Q. And, actually they aren't very serious? 
"A. Well, I don't think that very much dam-
age was done to his ability to see or ability in the 
future to see. 
"Q. As far as you know there was no damage 
done to his ability to see. 
"A. That is right. 
"MR. BERTOCH: That is all. Thank you, 
Doctor. 
l\1R. ROBERTS: That is all. May the Doctor 
be excused? 
"THE COURT: You may be excused. Thank 
you." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY 
THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING 
TO HAVE BE·EN GIVEN UNDER THE IN-
FLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE IN-
FLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR OF A POR-
TION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT 
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS DE-
NYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT WAS EXCES-
SIVE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY 
THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING 
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE IN-
FLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
A. The Verdict 
The verdict (concurred in by only six of the jurors) 
awarded defendant the sum of $12,500 for total general 
damages, diminished by reason of contributory negligence 
in the amount of $2,500, leaving net verdict of $10,000. 
$12,500 is the figure we are concerned with in determining 
whether or not the verdict was excessive (Duffy vs. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 218 P. 2d 1080, 118 U. 82; 
Wheat vs. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 250 P. 2d 932, and 
Justice Crockett's concurring opinion Moore vs. D. & R. 
G. W. R. R. Co., decided 1955, 292 P. 2d 849). 
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B. Extent of Injury 
l~. The only special damage suffered by the plaintiff was 
~. the loss of 11 or 12 days' work; and since his wage was 
~~. between $550 and $600 a month, his total wage loss was 
K! approximately $200. Therefore, we must conclude that the 
D[. remaining $12,300 was awarded for "pain and suffering 
~! * * * both mental and physical * * *" and "loss 
:liT of bodily function, if any, which plaintiff has suffered or 
:E~ which plaintiff will probably suffer in the future." (Court's 
instructions.) 
Defendant contends that the verdict is so grossly dis-
proportionate to any amount of damages which could have 
fairly been awarded, as to make manifest that the verdict 
was so suffused with passion and prejudice that the de-
fendant cannot have had a fair trial on the issues. The 
verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been 
motivated by prejudice or ill will toward the defendant. 
It is reasonable to conclude, of course, that the plain-
tiff, after consultation with skilled personal injury counsel 
before trial, would attempt to dramatize and stretch his 
mental and physical pain and suffering as much and as 
f: far as his conscience would permit; and it is also reasonable 
:{i: to believe that his own doctor's testimony would be a more 
ill reliable guide to the extent of his injuries than plaintiff's 
~rt own testimony. According to his own doctor's testimony 
~.r his injuries were comparatively minor, and any difficulty 
he was experiencing at the time of trial, or would exper-
IJ~; ience, if any, in the future was negligible. His vision was 
~.i 20;20 uncorrected, his eyesight in excellent condition for 
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a man 44; and the only discomfort he would experience 
would be the possibility of the working out of a few foreign 
particles, which discomfort would be minor, and his doctor 
believed that all of the particles had worked out that were 
going to work out and that he would not be conscious of 
or damaged by those that remained in. 
His doctor said, "I don't feel Mr. Stamp is in any 
danger.'' 
Plaintiff's counsel will try to make much of the mental 
suffering of the plaintiff from the date of the accident to 
and beyond the time of trial. It should be noted in that 
regard that within two hours after the accident plaintiff 
knew he had not lost the sight of his right eye, and on the 
morning of the third day the bandage was removed tempor-
arily from his left eye and he knew he had not lost his 
sight in either eye. ~~en he was sent home on the fifth 
day, he undoubtedly knew no serious harm had been done 
to his eyes. He denies the doctor told him at that time or 
a week later on November 17 that there was no permanent 
injury to his eyes, but he also says he did not ask the doctor 
that question. If he was worried at all at that time, it is 
inconceivable that he would not inquire about the future 
affect of the accident on his eyes. Dr. Palmer testified that 
on November 19, two weeks after the accident, he found 
the accident had not in any way impaired his vision, and 
he told the plaintiff that at that time. 
If the plaintiff has had any mental apprehension as to 
the condition of his eyes since that time, it has been an un-
reasonable and unfounded apprehension. The fact undoubt-
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edly is that since that time, and probably since he left the 
hospital four days after the accident, he has had no mental 
suffering. 
C. Excessiveness of the Verdict 
(1) Comparison with Utah Cases 
How excessive is this verdict? I think the case of 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 218 P. 2d 1080, 
118 U. 82, decided by this court in May 1950, is of consid-
erable assistance as a standard of comparison. Duffy was 
working as a rear brakeman, and his operation of a switch 
caused a hernia at the site of a previous gall bladder oper-
ation incision. He was hospitalized for thirteen days and 
endured a painful operation-more painful in its immediate 
after effects than the ordinary hernia operation, which 
itself causes excruciating pain during the convalescence 
period-more serious because extra surgery was made nec-
essary by the previous incision in order to diminish the 
possibility of recurrence. 
Duffy was off work from February 28 to June 16, a 
period of 3~~ months (compared to Stamp's 11 or 12 days), 
and his loss of earnings amounted to $1,300 (compared to 
Stamp's $200). 
The jury awarded Duffy the exact amount awarded to 
Stamp, to wit, $12,500, and it was reduced due to contrib-
utory negligence to $9,000. This court ordered a conditional 
remission of $4,000 of the net verdict, leaving verdict the 
sum of $5,000. 
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The Court said : 
"We must assume that the jury awarded plain-
tiff the sum of $1,300 for loss of wages, which were 
his only established special damages, and this leaves 
the sum of $11,200 for general damages. When we 
get in this domain reasonable minds might differ as 
to what amount is excessive. However, there must 
be a limit beyond which a reasonable jury cannot 
go and the limit must be determined on the gross 
amount of the verdict and not the net amount. Con-
ceding that jurors in different states and counties 
have different monetary standards and different 
ideas as to the value of pain and suffering; that 
present day costs of living are comparatively high; 
that the purchasing power of the dollar has de-
creased to approximately one-half of what it was 
some ten years ago; that we are seemingly in an 
inflationary spiral; and, that by all reasonable stan-
dards verdicts should be larger than they were at 
that period; we are, nevertheless, of the opinion in 
this case that the damages awarded by the jury have 
no foundation in fact, and are so grossly excessive 
and exorbitant as to convince the members of this 
court that the verdict is far in excess of what a 
reasonable jury could determine as the maximum 
amount awardable for this type of injury. For these 
reasons it appears to us to have been given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice. 
"* * * The permissible minimum and maxi-
mum limits within which a jury may operate for a 
given injury are presently far apart and must con-
tinue to be widespread so long as pain and suffering 
must be measured by money standards. If the jurors 
award damages which all reasonable persons would 
conclude were not outside permissible limits, we 
cannot invade their province by substituting our 
judgment for theirs, but when we believe that all 
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reasonable minds would conclude the limits have 
been exceeded we are permitted to correct the error." 
It appears patent that Duffy's injuries and damages 
far exceeded those of Stamp. His physical suffering was 
substantially greater and extended over a much longer 
period of time. Stamp's initial mental suffering for the 
first couple days was admittedly acute-more than Duffy's 
----but Stamp's was short lived. Duffy's worry and concern 
extended from the date of the accident on January 29 at 
least until favorable results of the operation of March 3 
were apparent to him. Having one incision break open, 
he undoubtedly worried for some time after the successful 
operation about the possibility of another rupture. 
The court, I think, can take judicial notice of the fact 
that there is little difference between the price level and 
value of money between 1950, the time of the Duffy case 
decision, and the present day; and, therefore, the Duffy 
case provides a helpful standard of comparison. If $5,000 
is the maximum limit to which reasonable minds should 
have gone in the Duffy case, then Stamp is entitled to some-
thing substantially less than that. 
Another Utah case which demonstrates how far out 
of line the Stamp verdict was, is Wheat vs. D. & R. G. W. 
R. R. Co., (supra), decided by this court in December 1952. 
In that case Wheat, while working as a hostler (engine 
handler), received an injury to his right shoulder, legs, 
elbow and back on March 11, 1950. On April 5 he was 
forced to discontinue working and was confined to a hos-
pital from that day until March 13, during which time he 
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was on a fracture board with his leg in traction. He was 
at his home from May 13 to May 22, then returned to the 
hospital for three more days. He was unable to return to 
work until December 25. He claimed, and his· medical evi-
dence corroborated his testimony, that from April 5 to 
December 25 he suffered pain in his shoulder, ribs, elbow 
and leg and could only stay up out of bed about three hours 
a day. He was still suffering when he returned to work 
but was required to return to work for financial reasons. 
His doctor's testimony also revealed that he had a limita-
tion of motion in his back which would be permanent. His 
loss of wages amounted to $3,460. 
The jury rendered a verdict for him in the sum of 
$17,000, the trial court reduced it to $10,000, and that re-
duction was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. Certainly 
Stamp's injuries and damages do not compare with those 
suffered by Wheat; and if Wheat was entitled only to 
$10,000, Stamp was entitled to only a small fraction of that 
amount. 
(2) Comparison with Other Eye Injury Cases 
Verdicts and judgments in similar cases are material 
in determining whether or not a particular verdict is ex-
cessive. 
"The courts have repeatedly recognized both in 
express statements and by constant references in 
their opinions to amounts which courts and other 
cases under similar conditions have allowed or held 
to be excessive, the value of precedents with refer-
ence to the proper amount of daiDages to be awarded 
for particular injuries." 
Am. Juris., Vol. 15, Damages, Section 207. 
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R!ti An examination of eye injury cases where somewhat 
~~· similar injuries existed or somewhat similar amounts were 
~~ awarded reveals the comparative excessiveness of the Stamp 
li~t verdict. I have limited this recital to cases decided in or 
Jnli after 1948 inasmuch as it is well known that the inflation-
l~~ ary spiral contributed to by the war continued upward at 
i!eL least until 1948, and verdicts before that, we must admit, 
to•· would not be helpful because of the decrease in the value 
r~&: of money that occurred most pronouncedly between 1939 
at. and 1948. The cost of living index is, I believe, slightly 
.1nt.[ higher now than in 1948, but from 1948 on there has been 
; ..•. 
a leveling off so that cases decided during the last eight 
years provide a reasonably fair guide, keeping in mind 
money is slightly less valuable now than it was in 1948. 
( ~) Where Verdict Reduced 
Jackson vs. Ellis, 212 S. W. 2d 715 (Arkansas, 
1948). 
The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 by the jury and it 
was reduced on appeal to $2,500. The court considered the 
evidence of injury and damages in the following language: 
"Mrs. Ellis testified she was partially 'knocked 
out' by the collision and had 'fading' periods. Was 
taken to Basin Park Hotel (Eureka Springs) in an 
ambulance, and the following day was sent to Fay-
etteville hospital, where she remained ten days. A 
long gash was cut in one leg. It was 'standing open' 
and bleeding. Ankle was hurt 'in some way' and 
pains sometime recur. Legs and ankle swell. Was 
also cut through the lip 'here'. The witness. said 
there was a scar, but she didn't suppose the jury 
could see it. Also thought eyesight was damaged-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
'I attribute it to injuries ; it "seems" I don't see as 
well as before. Think injury is to both eyes, rather 
than one. Pain under my hips was excruciating after 
the accident. Am nervous, especially at night when 
cars pass by and brakes "screetch".' 
"Dr. J. F. Johns, who attended Mrs. Ellis at 
Basin Park Hotel, and later sent her to Fayetteville, 
substantially confirmed what the patient said re-
garding cuts and bruises. He added that her great-
est complaint was of pains in the region of the right 
hip, but the Doctor 'couldn't detect that there was 
anything amiss, any injury to it.' He then explained 
that pain could not be seen, and that he accepted 
Mrs. Ellis' statements that she suffered; 'but', said 
he, 'she was evidently under great shock and mental 
stress and strain somewhere * * * I couldn't 
say whether her spine was hurt-don't think any 
doctor around here could.'" 
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. vs. Enloe et ux., 
225 S. W. 2d 431 (Texas, 1949). 
The jury verdict for the plaintiff was $10,000 including 
a thousand dollars for damages to plaintiff's automobile. 
The trial court reduced the verdict to $6,000, and the Su-
preme Court reduced the verdict for personal injuries to 
$2,100 and reduced the amount of the car damage from 
$1,000 to $900, so that the total verdict was reduced to 
$3,000. With respect to plaintiff's injuries the court stated 
as follows: 
"Billy L. Enwe, an army pilot, testified that 
both he and his wife were thrown out of and clear 
of his automobile; he was taken to Parkland Hos-
pital where he was treated for a cut below the eye-
brow, a cut in the right eyeball, a cut through the 
bridge of his nose and a cut underneath his right 
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eye; also a cut on his knee and shin, each about an 
inch long; that it required 17 stitches to sew up the 
cuts around his right eye; he suffered considerable 
pain in his leg; was removed :by army ambulance to 
Love Field Hospital where he remained for seven 
days ; then transferred to Fort Worth airfield hos-
pital where he was confined for six additional days; 
he was grounded as an army pilot for five months, 
due to impairment of his vision; his right eye now 
tends to tire before his left eye ; eyelid flickers and 
his eye waters; his eyebrow gets sore and he devel-
ops headaches from the soreness in his right eye 
below where he was cut; scar tissue formed in his 
right eyebrow and made a knot which feels numb; 
when it is touched, the feeling is in his hairline; he 
has headaches which originate around his eye about 
every month or six weeks and last from 24 to 48 
hours; the headaches cause pain ; the flickering of 
the eye tends to cause it not to function as well as it 
should ; and since the accident he has taken sick 
leave a few days as result of such headaches." 
Johnson vs. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
Ltd., 63 So. 2d 459 (Louisiana, 1953). 
ti:. Here the jury verdict was for $15,000 and reduced by 
r.~· the Supreme Court to $12,500. In this case the plaintiff's 
: ~: left eye was removed by surgery as a result of the accident 
,re: involved in the case. The court's discussion with respect to 
~; the injury and damages is as follows: 
"The Charity Hospital record reveals that plain-
!i tiff was twenty-seven years of age and had appar-
ct~ ently enjoyed physical good health prior to the acci-
~ dent; his left eye was removed by surgery on June 
!W lOth, 1951, and that he was discharged from the 
~~ hospital on or about June 19th, 1951. Plaintiff testi-
rit 
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fied that the removal of his eye has resulted in pain 
and suffering and caused the 'right eye to water' on 
many occasions. 
"The record leaves some doubt in our minds as 
to whether plaintiff will be in a position to resume 
the employment which he possessed on the date of 
the injury, that is 'a cook' on a ship owned by the 
Lykes Bros. Steamship company, where he earned 
a salary of $230 per month plus overtime, room and 
meals while aboard the ship. He is presently em-
ployed by the Electrical Supply Company, Inc., earn-
ing a salary of $35 per week. The American Exper-
ience Table of Mortality reflects that plaintiff, at 
the time of the loss of his left eye, had a life ex-
pectancy of 40.36 years. 
"We have carefully examined the record and 
the juris prudence, and we find that they fail to 
sustain an award of $15,000; therefore, we are of 
the opinion that the judgment should be amended 
so as to reduce the award from $15,000 to the sum 
of $12,500. In reaching this result we have consid-
ered all of the existing circumstances and the present 
devaluation of the dollar, and we are of the opinion 
that this award is proper. * * *" 
(b) Where Verdict Found Not Inadequate 
Wilt, Jr. vs. Blazier, 114 A. 2d 111 (Pa., 1955). 
Here the plaintiff was awarded $2,500 for injuries, 
including the laceration of an eye reducing his vision to 
20j70 corrected. He had expended $360.82 for medical and 
hospital expenses and lost wages in the amount of $570. 
He appealed on the grounds that the verdict was inadequate, 
but the court held that the verdict was adequate. 
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The court's discussion of the injury and damages is as 
follows: 
"The plaintiff Wilt also assigned in the court 
below as a reason for new trial the inadequacy of 
the verdict returned against Boggs. The court hav-
ing granted a new trial generally for the reasons 
stated, did not pass on the alleged inadequacy of 
the verdict. Wilt, who suffered a serious injury to 
his eye, expressed the belief that the impact caused 
his head to go through the windshield. The doctor 
called by him said that Wilt had a laceration of the 
eye as the result of the accident and that his eye-
sight was impaired; that even with corrective 
glasses, his vision was reduced to 20/70; that an 
operation would not give him normal sight in con-
nection with the other eye ; that without an opera-
tion he would suffer no pain in the future but would 
suffer inconvenience. Wilt was discharged from the 
hospital about two weeks after the accident and re-
turned to steady employment with the same em-
ployer on April 11, 1951, 3 months and 10 days 
after the accident. He stated that to regain his 
employment he had to relinquish benefits in case 
of sickness and accident and execute papers releas-
ing his employer from liability in case anything hap-
pened to him in his employment. He stated that 
before the accident he worked 'pretty regularly' and 
earned about $190 a month. His medical and hos-
pital expenses amounted to $360.83, his loss of wages 
$570, or a total of $930.83. It appears, therefore, 
that of the verdict of $2,500 about $1,500 was 
awarded him for pain, suffering and inconvenience. 
Undoubtedly a larger verdict representing a more 
liberal allowance for pain, suffering and inconven-
ience would have been justified, but under all the 
circumstances we are not disposed to disturb the 
award of the jury." 
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(c) Where Verdict Found Not Excessive 
My purpose in reviewing these cases where the verdict 
was found to be not excessive is to show that in instances 
of eye injuries where the extent of the injury was infinitely 
greater than that suffered by Stamp, the verdicts were 
less than the amount awarded to Stamp. 
Skiers vs. Cowgill, et al., 59 N. W. 2d 407, (Ne-
braska, 1953) . 
In this case an eight-year-old child permanently lost 
vision of her left eye, had frequent and often eye and head-
aches, had noticeable scar just outside her brow line, had 
bump on her head and would require surgery to correct a 
turning out of the left eye and a drooping of the left eyelid. 
The jury awarded a verdict of $10,000, and the appeal court 
found it was not excessive. 
The next two cases are particularly interesting because 
they were decided by a judge rather than jury and were 
not appealed by either party. They were both cases against 
the State of New York and were decided by the New York 
Court of Claims. 
Gould vs. State of New York, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 
251 (October 1949, N. Y.). 
Here the claimant was 28 years of age and was injured 
while a prison inmate. Because of the injury his right eye 
had to be removed, and he was awarded $10,000. He asserted 
that his left eye also was affected, but the court said there 
was no medical testimony to support that claim. The court 
said he was "fairly entitled to an award of $10,000 for 
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pain, suffering, loss of his eye and such diminution of 
earning power as may have occurred." 
Pecor vs. State of New York, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 
838 (N. Y., 1955). 
Here the plaintiff, a girl 5 years of age, suffered con-
tusions and abrasions of her head, arms and shoulders, a 
cerebral concussion, laceration of her lower lip requiring 
suturing which left a scar, and partial paralysis of a muscle 
in her left eye, causing double vision when she looked up 
and to the right. 
The judge awarded her $4,500. 
D. Position of Appellant 
It appears clear when Stamp's verdict and injuries 
are compared with the cases reviewed herein, that the 
$12,500 verdict was grossly excessive, far surpassing the 
maximum limit reasonable minds would set. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE IN-
FLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
The argument of the previous point, of course, is ap-
plicable here, and there is no question under Utah law but 
that the Supreme Court has the power and duty to correct 
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the trial court's abuse of discretion and order a new trial 
where the verdict, because of its excessiveness, appears to 
have been given as a result of passion or prejudice. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the Case of Pauly vs. 
McCarthy, 109 U. 431, 184 P. 2d 123, in the opinion written 
by the court on mandate from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, carefully considered previous Utah cases 
and laid down the following rule with regard to the func-
tion of the Supreme Court of this state in passing upon the 
size of verdict. 
"Some of the early cases recognized, at least 
impliedly, that the trial judge might order a remis-
sion from an excessive verdict. Kennedy et al. vs. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., supra; Nelson vs. South-
ern Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P. 644. 
But from the language used in these and other de-
cisions a view developed that this court was power-
less to interfere with a jury verdict, no matter how 
outrageous. This view was exploded in the case of 
Jensen vs. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 
P. 1185, 1192, where, after citing with approval 
many of the cases above cited, we said: 
" 'Still the jury cannot be permitted to go un-
bridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new 
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be 
granted by the court below on the ground of "ex-
cessive damages appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice." Whenever 
that is made to appear, the court, when its action is 
properly invoked, should require a remission or set 
the verdict aside and grant a new trial * * * 
Whether a new trial should or should not be granted 
on this ground, of necessity, must largely rest within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. 
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"'Still that court, in such particular, is not 
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may neverthe-
less be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged 
abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary 
exercise of power in such respect. Such a review is 
not review of a question of fact, but of law * * * 
our power to correct a plain abuse of discretion or 
undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of 
power cannot be doubted. * * *' " 
It is defendant's contention that the verdict in this 
case is so excessive as to show that it must have been moti-
vated by prejudice or ill will toward the defendant and that 
therefore a new trial should be granted unconditionally. 
The case of Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 250 
P. 2d 932, presents the Utah rule on this matter. The court 
in that case said: 
"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so 
grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages 
which could have fairly been awarded as to make 
manifest that the verdict was so suffused with pas-
sion and prejudice that the defendant could not 
have had a fair trial on the issues, the trial court 
should unconditionally grant a new trial." 
Later in the opinion the court says : 
"* * * we regard the true rule to be that 
if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must 
have been motivated by prejudice or ill will toward 
a litigant, or that passion such as anger, resentment, 
indignation or some kindred emotion, has so over-
come or distorted the jury's reason that the verdict 
is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, it should be un-
conditionally set aside." 
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It is defendants' position that this verdict should be 
set aside and a new trial granted unconditionally. 
POINT Ill 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR OF A POR-
TION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT 
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS DE-
NYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT WAS EXCES-
SIVE. 
If a trial court does not believe that the verdict was so 
excessive as to show that it must have been motivated by 
prejudice or passion, but he does believe that the verdict is 
in excess of the maximum limit which all reasonable persons 
would consider justified, then he should order a new trial 
conditionally; that is, he should order the plaintiff to make 
a remittitur of what the court considers to be the excessive 
portion of the verdict. 
If the Supreme Court believes that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to order a remittitur, the 
Supreme Court has the power and duty to correct the abuse 
by itself ordering a remittitur as a condition precedent to 
the denial of a new trial. 
This position is amply supported by the Duffy and 
Wheat cases cited above. The Duffy case, of course, is not 
in all respects the law in Utah now. The rule laid down 
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in that case has been altered by the Wheat case. In the 
Duffy case the court held that when it found a verdict was 
the product of passion and prejudice, the court had two 
alternatives: (1) ordering a new trial unconditionally or 
(2) ordering a remittitur of part of the verdict as a con-
dition precedent to refusing a new trial. The court in the 
Duffy case said in this regard : 
"Section 104-40-2 (5), U. C. A. 1943 (Now Rule 
59 (a) (5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), provides 
that a verdict of a jury may be vacated and a new 
trial granted by the trial judge when damages are 
excessive and appear to have been given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice. Trial courts of 
this and other states grafted on to that provision 
the right of the trial court to refuse to grant a new 
trial when the damages were excessive if the win-
ning party would consent to a reduction. The pro-
vision was thus extended by a judicial decision to 
permit trial courts to require a remission of part 
of the damages or suffer the consequences of a new 
trial. This court placed its stamp of approval upon 
that procedure and has on many occasions indicated 
that our rights of review are limited to a determina-
tion of whether the trial judge abused his discre-
tion in not granting a new trial unless the plaintiff 
consented to a reduction in the amount of the ver-
dict." 
iii' The Wheat case still provides the same two alternatives 
~ei: but makes them mutually exclusive in any particular case. 
e1lt The Wheat opinion rules that ( 1) if the verdict is the 
product of passion and prejudice, there is no alternative 
fiJi in that particular case-a new trial must be ordered un-
conditionally; (2) if, however, the verdict is excessive or ~~~ 
ia~( "unduly liberal" but not found to be the product of passion 
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or prejudice, then the court must use the other alternative: 
order a new trial conditionally--conditioned on the failure 
to make a remittitur. 
The Supreme Court in the Wheat case gave its blessing 
to that procedure in the nature of its decision. The trial 
court had ordered a remittitur; the defendant appealed, 
asking the unconditional grant of a new trial. The court 
held the verdict was not so excessive as to evince it was 
the child of passion and prejudice, and therefore denied a 
new trial but agreed with the trial court that the verdict 
was excessive and approved and upheld the trial court's 
diminution of the verdict as a condition to denying a new 
trial. 
In the Wheat case opinion the court specifically recog-
nized an area of wrongful excessiveness lying somewhere 
between the "passion and prejudice" verdict and the "maxi-
mum limit" which reasonable men would not exceed, when 
the court said : 
"In Stevens Ranch & Livestock Co. vs. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., ( 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459, 462) 
we quoted with approval this language: 
"'Unless it clearly appears from the court rec-
ord that an excessive verdict in a personal injury 
action resulted from prejudice or passion rather than 
an undue liberality exercised by the jury in award-
ing damages, the trial court's action in remitting a 
part of the verdict instead of granting a new trial 
will not be disturbed.'" 
In other words, the court implied that where a verdict 
represents "undue liberality," though there is no finding of 
passion or prejudice, a court is justified in reducing the 
verdict. 
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Justice Crockett recognized the possible propriety of 
the use of this remittitur alternative, under proper circum-
stances, in his concurring opinion in the very recent case 
of Moore vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany (supra) when he says: 
"They (plaintiff's counsel) suggest that if this 
court deems the judgment excessive, that under the 
authority of Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany this court could order a remittitur. This may 
be so under some circumstances, (italics supplied) 
but if the verdict actually appears to have been given 
as a result of passion and prejudice, that so taints 
the verdict. * * *" Then, he says, the verdict 
should not stand. 
This court has either required or approved reductions 
in verdicts in at least eleven cases. The cases and the ap-
proximate percentages of the net verdict constituting re-
mission as recited in Ladder vs. Western Pacific R. Co., 259 
P. 2d 589, decided 1953, are as follows: 
Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 250 P. 
932 .................................. 41% 
Falkenberg vs. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008.63% 
Duffy vs. Union Pac. R. Co., Utah, 218 P. 2d 
1080 . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 44.4% 
Mecham vs. Foley, Utah, 235 P. 2d 497 ....... 50% 
Pauly vs. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 
23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 30% 
Geary vs. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 P. 416 ...... 47% 
Eleganti vs. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 
168 P. 266 .............. 41% 
Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. vs. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459 . . . . . . . . . 40% 
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Kennedy vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 18 Utah 
325, 54 P. 988 ......................... 27% 
Bourne vs. Moore, 77 Utah 184, 292 P. 1102 .. .47% 
Sheperd vs. Payne, 60 Utah 140, 206 P. 1098 .. 25% 
CONCLUSION 
We believe it is within the power of this court in this 
case ( 1) to find that the verdict was a product of passion 
or prejudice and on that basis grant a new trial uncondi-
tionally, or (2) to find that the verdict was excessive and 
"unduly liberal" even though not inspired by passion and 
prejudice, and in that event order a remittitur of a portion 
of the verdict on the condition that a new trial will not be 
had if the reduction is accepted by the plaintiff and the 
remittitur paid. 
However, it is the opinion of the defendant that in the 
light of the facts of this case, considering the limited in-
juries of the plaintiff and the exorbitant size of the verdict, 
that the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have 
been inspired by passion andjor prejudice and that a new 
trial should be granted unconditionally. 
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